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Introduction
There is now a substantial economics literature that argues that taxation can strengthen the quality of governance and public sector institutions by making governments more responsive and accountable to their citizens, by building capacity, and by improving public policy. However, empirical evidence to this effect-supportive or otherwise-is scant. In this paper, we add to this scarce literature by testing for direct evidence of a relationship between tax revenue and changes in indicators of the quality of governance in a cross-section of developed and developing economies. We find that higher tax revenues (in relation to GDP) are consistently associated with improvements in the quality of governance. This result is robust to different estimation methodologies, to variations in the country sample, and to controlling for the influence of variables that other studies have identified as affecting the quality of governance. Our results support the notion that policies aimed at mobilizing tax revenues may be justified based on the greater accountability of government that may result.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes arguments in the literature on how taxation can improve the quality of governance. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and our methodology, respectively.
Our empirical results are presented in section 5, and a final section concludes.
How taxation can improve governance
Traditionally, high taxation has been associated with interventionist governments and as a likely indicator of poor governance (Smith 1976 , North 1981 , Knack and Keefer 1995 . However, there is a growing literature that argues that high taxation can support better governance by binding together governments and citizens (e.g., Bräutigam, 2002 Bräutigam, , 2008 Fjeldstad, and Moore, 2008; Collier 2007; Moore, 1998 Moore, , 2007 . In this view, tax decisions are the outcome of a bargain between governments and citizens. Citizens respond to tax demands by organizing to negotiate tax levels, monitor how taxes are collected and used, and to influence public policy. The bargaining process is viewed as improving governance in several ways. First, it makes governments more responsive and accountable to their citizens. Second, as tax compliance increases, state capacity improves and the taxation process becomes more efficient and predictable. Third, better public policy results from debate and negotiation with citizens. This view also stresses that the composition of government revenues is likely to affect the quality of governance. In particular, the quality of governance is likely to be poor where governments receive substantial non -tax revenues-for example, from foreign aid inflows or natural resource rents-because they have less need to negotiate tax demands and to make concessions to citizens. In turn, citizens are less motivated to scrutinize how government revenues are collected and spent and have less leverage over public policy. The quality of governance might even be undermined if governments respond to new non -tax revenues reducing domestic taxation.
Not surprisingly, aherents to the view that taxation promotes good governance have tried to taxation at the core of countries ' development efforts.
The direct empirical evidence on the relationship between taxation and governance is both sparse and mixed. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) report that richer countries impose higher taxes, have better tax compliance, and larger governments in their cross-section study of the determinants of the quality of government; and Hoffman and Gibson (2005) find that local governments in Tanzania and Zambia produce more public services as the share of local taxes in their budgets increases, whereas revenue in the form of transfers from the central government and foreign assistance increases the share of local budgets consumed by employee benefits and administrative costs. However , Ross (2004) finds no association between taxation and democracy (which he employs as an indicator of good governance) in a pooled time-series study of 113 countries; and Juul (2006) finds no relationship between the decentralization of tax revenue and the strengthening of local democratic structures in Senegal.
There is some empirical evidence that the composition of government revenues can affect the quality of governance. For example, in cross section studies of the impact of foreign aid inflows, Busse and Gröning (2009) and Bräutigam and Knack (2004) find them to be associated with a deterioration in governance, and Knack (2001) finds that aid given through technical assistance erodes bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, but that aid levels are not significantly related to corruption . In contrast, Tavares (2003) reports that foreign aid inflows decrease corruption in recipient countries. In studies of the impact of natural resource rents, Isham et al. (2005) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) find that governments use them to mollify dissent, avoid accountability, and ease pressures for institutional reform; Leite and Weidmann (2002) find that they increase corruption, and Collier and Hoeffler (2005) find that competition for rents stunts institutional development and increases the probability of civil conflict.
Finally, there is some evidence that governments mobilize less revenue from domestic taxation when they receive large inflows of foreign aid and significant natural resource rents. For example, Brautigam and Knack (2004) , Gupta et al., (2004) , and Swaroop et al., (1999) report substantial offsets between foreign aid inflows and domestic tax revenues, and Bornhorst et al., (2009) report a substantial offset between natural resource rents and revenue from domestic taxes.
In contrast, many empirical studies provide direct evidence that poor governance adversely affects economic performance, including by reducing investment and GDP growth (Braun and Di Tella, 2000; Mauro, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 1995) , increasing inflation (Al-Marhubi, 2000; Blackburn et al., 2008) , widening income inequality and poverty (Gupta et al., 2002) , reducing foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000; Lskavyan and Spatareanu, 2008) , favoring military over other public spending (Gupta et al., 2001) , and biasing the provision of public goods away from education (Mauro, 1998) . For any of these reasons, countries with poor governance may become poor performers.
Data description
Our indicator of governance is the quality of governance index produced by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This is a composite of three indices, namely an index of bureaucratic quality, an index of corruption in government, and an index of the rule of law. All three indices are clearly linked to governance, with the latter index aimed at reflecting the government 's administrative capacity in enforcing the law, and the potential for rent-seeking associated with weak legal systems and insecure property rights.
Each index is subjective and is scaled from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating, respectively, a higher quality of bureacracy, less corruption, and better law and order enforcement. The composite quality of governance index, therefore, is an 18-point scale where the data are annual averages of monthly observations. The underlying data on tax revenue are drawn from the International Monetary Fund 's (IMF) Government Finance Statistics and World Economic Outlook databases. Tax revenue is expressed in relation to GDP. The data are annual averages and include total tax revenue and revenue from the personal income tax, the corporate income tax, social security taxes, the sales tax, and taxes on international trade.
The dataset comprises annual observations for 117 developed and developing economies for the period 1984-2006, though observations are not available for all countries for all years. The sample period for each country in the dataset is given in the Appendix Table 1. Many variables have been found to affect the quality of governance (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Swamy et al., 2001; Treisman, 2000) , and we control for several of them in our estimates. Our baseline control variables are a country 's population and GDP per capita, which are drawn from Heston et al. (2009) .
Population is included to capture economies of scale in establishing effective institutions (Srinivasan, 1986; Knack, 2001) ; and per capita GDP is included to capture increases in the volume and size of transactions, which would increase the benefits of developing institutions such as commercial codes and their associated adjudication and enforcement mechanisms (Knack, 2001; Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986) .
We also report results from estimates that include three additional controls because their influence on governance has been found to be robust in a range of empirical studies (Serra, 2006) . These are: a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country achieved colonial independence after 1945, the data for which is derived from The CIA World Factbook 2010; 1 a country 's degree of ethnic fractionalization, the data for which is taken from Alesina et al., (2003) ; and a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has maintained democratic institutions for a continuous period since 1950, which is taken from Serra (2006) . Colonial independence after 1945 is included because public institutions take time to create and adapt to local circumstances, so that younger countries may be more prone to poor governance; in addition, institutions inherited from a former colonial power may be ill suited to local needs making them vulnerable to irregular practices. Ethnic fractionalization is included because political theories predict that, as ethnic heterogeneity increases, governments become more interventionist and less efficient, the quality of public goods falls and political freedoms are restricted (La Porta et al. 1999) . Tanzi (1995) suggests that in developing countries noneconomic ties are strong and government officials tend to benefit their next of kin and ethnic group.
Continuous democracy is included to because governance has been found to be better in democratic countries and in those with a freer press and more vigorous civic associations (Treisman, 2000) . Table 1 reports basic statistics for the key variables.
Methodology
If taxation improves the quality of governance, then countries with higher tax revenues should record better scores on the quality of governance index over time. Accordingly, our dependent variable is the change in the quality of governance index, ∆QGOV, which we measure as the end-of-period value of the index minus the initial value of the index. In our baseline estimates we include as independent variables: the average ratio of tax revenue to GDP, TREV, to capture the impact of taxation on governance; the initial value of the quality of governance index, IQGOV, to capture regression -to-the-mean effects and to control for the limited opportunity of low-and high-rated countries, respectively, to decrease and increase their scores; the change in population over the sample period expressed as a fraction of its initial value, POP, and the change in per capita GDP over the sample period expressed as a fraction of its initial value, GDP.
Th erefore, our baseline specification is:
The OLS estimates of equation (1) could suffer from endogen eity bias in the sense that tax revenues may also be influenced by the quality of governance. For example, Flatters and Macleod (1995) and Toye and Moore (1998) discuss collusion between tax officials and taxpayers to understate tax liabilities, and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Friedman et al., (2000) have provided evidence that countries with more corruption tend to collect fewer tax revenues in relation to GDP, all else being equal. The presence of endogeneity has generally been dealt with in cross-sectional analyses through the use of instrumental variables (IV). We try to deal with the possible endogeneity of tax revenues by adapting a methodology used by Lee and Gordon (2005) in their study of taxation and economic growth , in which they instrument corporate and personal tax rates by the average of these tax rates in neighboring countries. Thus, our instrument for the tax revenue ratio is the average tax revenue ratio in neighboring countries, where neighboring countries tax ratios are weighted by the inverse of the distance between the two countries. 2 The correlation between the actual tax ratio and the tax ratio in neighboring countries (the 'instrument ') is high (0.87) but the level of governance in a country that is small relative to th e regional and world economy should have virtually no effect on the tax ratio in these other countries. There seems to be little reason to expect tax revenue ratios in neighboring countries to impact on a county 's governance other than though its influence on that country 's tax revenue ratio. As additional instruments, we use dummies identifying countries ' legal origins (British, French, Socialist, Germanic, or Scandinavian) because of their success in studies relating public sector activities to governance (e.g., Fisman and Gati, 2002; de Mello and Barenstein, 2001; Mauro, 1998) . The instruments predict the actual tax ratio quite well, with the R 2 for the first-stage being 0.76.
Empirical Results
Results using OLS are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 . The coefficients on the tax revenue ratio are positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent level. However, the impact of taxation on the quality of governance index appears to be relatively small with the coefficients on the tax ratios indicating that an increase in the tax revenue share of GDP by 17-21 percentage points is needed to increase the quality of governance index by 1 point. Only three countries in the sample managed an increase in their tax ratios by amounts approaching these magnitudes (Bolivia 16.9 percentage points; Dominican Republic 16.3
percentage points, and Ghana, 15.8 percentage points), and the increase in these tax revenue ratios mainly reflected recoveries from economic crisis that returned tax ratios close to pre-crisis levels. The average increase in the tax ratio for all countries in the sample was just 1 percentage point. 3 The impact of increases in the tax revenue ratio on the quality of governance is somewhat greater in the IV results, which are reported in columns 3 and 4 of In both the OLS and IV estimates, there is a quite strong regression -to-the-mean effect. Other things being equal, a country with an initial quality of governance index 1 unit greater than another country will experience a decline of 0.38 to 0.41 of a point. In addition, changes in population and in per capita GDP both have statistically significant and positive effects. Each 10 percent increase in population and in GDP per capita is associated with an increase in the quality of governance index of 0.21-0.24. Table 3 replicates the IV regressions from Table 2 , substituting as the dependent variable changes in each of the three components of the quality of governance index. The bottom row of the table reports the OLS coefficients and standard errors for tax revenue. Correlations among the three separate components of the quality of governance index range from 0.27 to 0.32, indicating that the strength of the tax -governance relation could vary substantially across the three governance indicators. There are a few notable differences when the results are compared to those reported in Table 2 . In both the IV and the OLS results, tax revenue is positively and significantly related to improvements in bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, but not related significantly to corruption. Changes in GDP per capita and in population also are positive and significantly related to improvements in bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, but not to corruption . Table 4 sheds some light on the role of different taxes in improving the quality of governance. If taxation promotes better governance by encouraging citizens to organize to negotiate tax levels, monitor tax collection and usage, and to influence public policy, it seems reasonable to expect that those taxes that fall directly on citizens-such as personal income and social security taxes-would be the most effective in improving governance. This is precisely what seems to be the case. The IV results reported in Table 4 (and the OLS coefficients and standard errors for tax revenue reported in the final row of the table) indicate that the revenue ratios from personal income taxes, social security taxes, and the sales tax have a positive and statistically significant effect on the quality of governance index . 4 In practice, these are also the taxes that contribute the most to government revenues. For example, the average contribution of the sales tax to total tax revenue in our sample was 30.2 percent, and for social security taxes and the personal income tax it was 21.5 percent and 15.7 percent of total tax revenue, respectively. In contrast, the influence on the quality of governance of the corporate income tax ratio (averaging 12.4 percent of total tax revenue) and the international trade tax ratio (11.8 percent of total tax revenue) is not statistically significant. Moreover, as revenues from personal income, social security, and sales taxes tend to increase as a proportion of total tax revenue as a country 's level of development progresses (Goode, 1984; Farhadian -Lorie and Katz, 1989) , the change in the composition of tax revenues as well as the level of taxation would appear to be important in explaining the association between relatively high total tax revenues ratios and better governance over time.
In Table 5 , we report results from IV estimates (with OLS results for the tax revenue and interaction variables reported in the final rows of the table) that include the three additional control variables found by Serra (2006) to be robust in their relation to governance indicators (mainly corruption) across a range of empirical studies. Specifically, the results show how colonial independence, ethnic fractionalization, and continuous democracy interact with taxation to affect the quality of governance. The results indicate marked differences in their impact. The overall impact of taxation on governance remains statistically significant and positive but is reduced markedly when the coefficient on the interaction variable for colonial independence after 1945 is included as an independent variable (column 1). For example, the size of the tax revenue coefficient falls from 0.0676 (column 4 of Table 2 ) to 0.0371 (column 1 of Table 5 ). The overall impact of taxation on governance becomes negative when the interaction variable for ethnic fractionalization is included, with the (combined) coefficient falling to -0.076 (column 2 of Table 5 ); and inclusion of the interaction variable for continuous democracy reduces the overall impact of the tax ratio by about half (column 3 of Table 5 ).
Other robustness tests
The positive association between tax revenue and the quality of governance appears robust to alternative estimation methodologies and to reasonable changes in the cross-country sample. As an alternative methodology (to OLS and IV), we organized countries into quartiles according to the progress made in improving the quality of governance over the sample period and employed probit estimation. In this case, the dependent variable was equal to 1 if a country was located in the highest quartile and zero otherwise.
The results turn out to be similar to the OLS and IV results reported in Table 2 . For example, the coefficient (and standard error) on the tax revenue ratio in an equation that includes the change in population and the change in GDP per capita as control variables is 0.0721 (0.0199), which is significant at the 99 percent level of confidence. Th e full probit regression results are reported in Appendix Table 2 .
The results from estimates of equation (1) over different country sub-samples are reported in Table 6 . The table reproduces the tax revenue coefficients from columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 for comparison purposes and the following rows show the corresponding results (OLS and IV) for total tax revenue for various alternative sub-samples. Many transition economies have experienced substantial volatility in their tax revenue ratios reflecting a combination of tax reform and output volatility in the transition process. Row 2 deletes these countries from the sample. The tax revenue coefficient remains positive and statistically significant. Row 3 deletes from the sample the high -income OECD economies. These economies typically have high tax ratios relative to other countries and high scores on the quality of governance index that changed very little over the sample period. The tax revenue coefficient rises slightly relative to the base case and remains positive and significant.
The composition of government revenues may affect governance adversely if a large share of revenue is form non -tax sources, such as foreign aid inflows and natural resource rents. In this regard, Bräutigam and Knack (2004) and Gupta et al., (2004) show that economies receiving substantial foreign aid-mainly
African economies-exhibit a reduced tax revenue mobilization effort. Row 4 deletes from the sample the African economies, which tend to have among the lowest tax revenue ratios and the lowest scores on the quality of governance index. Th e tax revenue coefficients remain positive and statistically significant, though the coefficients are somewhat larger than in the base case. Similarly, Bornhorst et al., (2009) have shown that economies receiving substantial revenues from hydrocarbons exports exhibit a reduced domestic revenue effort. Row 5 of the table deletes these countries from the sample. The tax revenue coefficients remain positive and significant and are broadly unchanged from the base case.
Conclusion
A growing literature argues that taxation can strengthen the quality of governance and public sector institutions by making governments more responsive and accountable to their citizens, by building capacity, and by improving public policy. In this paper, we have provided empirical support for this view.
Using data on a cross-section of developed and developing countries, we find that taxation improves the quality of governance and that revenue from those taxes that are borne most directly by citizens are the most important in improving governance. The main exception to this general result is the case of countries where there is a high degree of ethnic fractionalization, which appears to interact with tax revenue ratios in a way that more than offsets any beneficial effect of taxation on the quality of governance. Our results are statistically significant and are robust to different estimation methodologies, to variations in the country sample, and to controlling for the influence of other variables that are generally robust in their effects on Appendix The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the country is in the top quartile of good governance. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
